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Abstract:  We report on an experimental demonstration of the modified 
Ekert 91 protocol of quantum key distribution using a hybrid entanglement 
source with two different degrees of freedoms, a 1550 nm time-bin qubit 
and 810 nm polarization qubit. The violation of the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt inequality could be demonstrated for the entanglement 
between the polarization qubit in free space and the time-bin qubit through 
20 km fiber transmission. The secure key rate in our system is estimated 70-
150 bps. 
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1. Introduction  
Data theft by directly tapping installed fibers is becoming a reality these years [1]. Quantum 
key distribution (QKD) [2] provides a mean to detect such hacking on a physical channel, and 
allows two users to share random numbers with the unconditional security based on the 
fundamental laws of physics. Recently QKD systems have been deployed in the field 
environment [3-5] in parallel with commercialization [6,7].  Moreover, some organizations 
have started practical use of QKD for their confidential communications [8,9]. Theoretical 
[10,11] and experimental [12-14] efforts have been made continuously to enhance the 
performance and the reliability of QKD systems. Decoy-state methods [15,16] for the Bennett 
and Brassard scheme (BB84) [17] and a derived protocol [18] are widely used for long 
distance QKD through field installed fibers.  
Meanwhile entanglement QKD protocols are studied as next generation technology, 
which will eventually be combined with quantum repeaters for extending the range of QKD 
networks [19]. Entanglement based QKD has higher tolerance to side channel attacks than 
BB84. In addition, it does not need a random number generator for key bits, allowing simpler 
implementation of the system. Recently, long distance entanglement distribution has been 
demonstrated, such as over a 300 km fiber [20] and 144 km in free space [21]. Future QKD 
network would integrate the fiber transmission and free−space transmission to extend the 
range of applications. The entanglement based QKD would be a favorable option for this 
purpose because a seamless quantum link with much less security loopholes could be made 
based on it. 
For fiber-based QKD, the time-bin format [22] is widely adopted because of its 
robustness against polarization mode disturbance. On the other hand, for free space 
transmission, the polarization format is mostly used. It also allows straightforward 
implementation of encoding and decoding with high precision and stability by using compact 
polarizing optical components.  
To combine ease of handling a polarization qubit and high-compatibility with fiber 
transmission of a time-bin qubit, we proposed a hybrid entanglement photon pair source with 
these degrees of freedoms in different wavelengths and demonstrated entanglement 
distribution over a hybrid link between a fiber and free space channels [23]. The time-bin 
qubit was made in a telecom wavelength while the polarization qubit in a near-infrared 
wavelength. The latter allowed us to use compact silicon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) to 
detect the polarization qubit efficiently.  
In this paper, we present the implementation of a modified Ekert 91(E91) protocol with 
the hybrid entanglement photon pair source. In E91 protocol [24], three bases are used for 
testing Bell inequality violation to detect eavesdropping. Recently Acín and co-workers 
proposed a modified E91 protocol, in which a combination of three bases on one side and two 
on the other side was used [25], which is simpler than the original E91 protocol where three 
bases are used on both sides. A. Ling and co-workers demonstrated 1.5 km free−space link 
and succeeded in generating secure keys with the modified E91 link using a polarization 
entanglement source [26]. In this paper, we demonstrate the violation of a CHSH-type Bell 
inequality and the implementation of the modified E91protocol through a 20 km fiber.  
2. Experimental setup of a modified E91 with a hybrid entanglement photon source 
Figures 1(a)-1(c) show the conceptual view of our experiment setup. The hybrid entanglement 
photon source is constructed of a non-degenerate photon pair source and a format transformer 
[23] from time encoding to polarization encoding. A 30 mm long periodically poled lithium 
niobate (PPLN) bulk crystal is quasiphase-matched to generate copolarized entangled photons 
at 810 and 1550 nm. A 532 nm continuous wave (CW) laser of 130 mW is used as a pump 
laser. After non-degenerate down conversion, 810 and 1550 nm photons are separated via a 
dichroic mirror. A 1550 nm photon is sent to Bob via a 22 km dispersion shifted fiber (DSF), 
and is input to the decoder. The decoder is a two-input and four-output silica-based planer 
lightwave circuit (PLC) on a silicon substrate [27], as depicted in Fig. 3(c), featured by an 
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) with 800 ps time delay. The output 
photons of the decoder are projected onto vectors |0>, |0>−|1>, |0>+|1>, and |1>, where |0> 
represents a photon in the first time-bin (having passed through the short arm), and |1> 
represents a photon in the second time-bin (having passed through the long arm).  
  
Bob
1550 nm 
photon
Format transform Glan
laser prism
Polarizer
45 deg
Delay:  800 ps
Free 
space |0〉
|1〉
|0〉±|1〉
√2
TIATrigger signals are sent
through 20 km fiber lines
Entangled photon
Pair source
Fiber 20 km
Trigger from detectors
LD
Classical communication
20 km pair fiber
PD
CW 532 nm
YAG 130 mW
DWDM
DWDM
Alice
810 nm 
photon
|H〉
|V〉
|H〉±|V〉
√2
(a)
|1〉
|0〉
 
PLC
2’
1’
4’
3’
810 nm photon 1550 nm photon
Delay: 800 ps
SSPDs
PBS
BS
1
2
Free 
space
PBS
3
Alice
PBS
4
6
5
1’
2’
3’
4’
Bob
1(H)
2(V)
3(67.5)
5(22.5)
4(-22.5)
6(-67.5)
setting (Alice)
ak: 1, 2
a0: 3, 4
a1: 5, 6
setting (Bob)
b0: 1’, 2’
b1: 3’, 4’
Half wave plate
-11.25 deg
Half wave plate
-33.75 deg
Bob
SPCMs
(b) (c)
 
Fig. 1. (a)  Conceptual view of the modified E91 protocol QKD system setup. 
(b) Receiving set for 810 nm photon (Alice). (c) Decoding set for 1550 nm 
photon (Bob). PBS: Polarization Beam Splitter. 
An 810 nm photon is input to a format-transformer, whose detailed structure and an 
equivalent optical setup are shown in Figs. 2(a)-2(b). The format-transformer consists of a 
polarizer set at 45° and a polarization sensitive AMZI constructed of a Glan laser prism, 
polarization-maintained (PM) fiber, and a mirror [28]. The path difference is set to provide the 
same delay (800 ps) in Bob’s PLC. The polarization qubit thus formed at the 810 nm photon 
is delivered in free space and coupled to a polarizing decoder circuit at Alice, as shown in Fig. 
1(b). 
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Fig. 2. (a) Conceptual view and (b) equivalent optical setup of the format 
transformer with 800 ps time delay [28]. 
The detectors at Alice side are Si based APDs [Perkin Elmer single photon counting modules 
(SPCMs)]. The detection efficiency and timing jitter of the SPCM are about 55% and 400 ps, 
respectively. The dark counts of SPCMs are a few kc/s. The detectors at Bob side are 
superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs) [29,30]. The SSPDs have the detection 
efficiencies around 60-70% at the dark count rate of 100 c/s for 1550 nm photons. The 
coincidence counts are measured by the time interval analyzer (TIA [Hydra harp 400]). In 
order to compensate time delay of Bob side due to the fiber transmission, we add delay lines 
for the signals from Alice, as described in the following. Optical pulses synchronized with the 
SPCM signals are generated using laser diodes. The optical pulses are multiplexed with the 
trigger signals by dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) filters and transmitted 
through 20 km single mode (SM) fibers. Those signals are detected by PIN photodiode, and 
sent to the TIA.  
Through the format-transformer, the entanglement state is created in the following form; 
                [ ]{ }1 0 exp ( ) (0) 1
2 A B A B
H i i Vφ θ τ θ= + − − ,                     (1) 
where |H> and |V> represent horizontal and vertical polarization states, respectively. The 
indices A and B abbreviate Alice and Bob. The relative phase θ(t) is defined with respect to a 
reference path length difference τ between the short and the long arms. 
As mentioned in [26], in the modified E91 protocol, the entanglement state written in eq. 
(1) is measured by a detector unit with the combination of three and two bases shown in Fig. 
1(b) and 1(c). The three bases at Alice side are set with polarization angle offsets with 0°, -
22.5°, and -67.5°, respectively. The pair of detector setting (ak, b0) is used to generate the raw 
key.  The combinations of other settings are applied to test the violation of the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) [31] inequality |S|≤2 with  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1, , , ,S E a b E a b E a b E a b= + + −  ,                            (2) 
where E is the correlation coefficients determined by the coincidence counts between 
detectors at Alice and Bob. The number of ni, j corresponds to the coincidence count between 
the detector “i” at Alice side and detector “j” at Bob side. Correlation coefficients E are given 
as follows; 
( ) 3,1' 4,2' 3,2' 4,1'0 0
3,1' 4,2' 3,2' 4,1'
,
n n n n
E a b
n n n n
+ − −
=
+ + +
 
( ) 3,3' 4,4' 3,4' 4,3'0 1
3,3' 4,4' 3,4' 4,3'
,
n n n n
E a b
n n n n
+ − −
=
+ + +
 
( ) 5,2' 6,1' 5,1' 6,2'1 0
5,2' 6,1' 5,1' 6,2'
,
n n n n
E a b
n n n n
+ − −
=
+ + +
 
  ( ) 5,4' 6,3' 5,3' 6,4'1 1
5,4' 6,3' 5,3' 6,4'
,
n n n n
E a b
n n n n
+ − −
=
+ + +
 . 
 (3) 
According to [32], a tight bound on the Holevo information between one of the authorized 
parties and the eavesdropper is given as; 
21 4 1
2Eve
S
I h
 + −
 =
 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                (4) 
with the binary entropic function 2 2( ) log (1 ) log (1 )h x x x x x= − − − . This formula provides an 
unconditional security bound against the optimal collective attack. To operate this setup as the 
QKD system, time stamp units are set on both sides, and correlated photons are identified by 
their time of arrival at each detector. According to the pair of detector ports, coincidence 
counts are used for generating raw keys or estimating the CHSH-type Bell inequality. After 
estimating of the eavesdropper knowledge and quantum bit error rate, the secure key is 
distilled.  We estimate the secure key rate by I(A,B)-IEve.  In the next section, we show the 
experimental results. 
3. Experimental results 
Figure 3 shows the degree of violation of the CHSH-type Bell inequality as a function of the 
PLC operation temperature. The phase of the PLC is almost linearly shifted in this region. 
Coincidence counts are accumulated for 10 s with the time window of 64 ps. The value of S is 
almost equal when we apply the time window with 128 ps, however, it changes drastically 
with longer time window. The error bar on the value of S is estimated to be less than 2% using 
three time measurements. The error bars are smaller than the size of the symbol. The influence 
of the accidental coincidence counts on both detectors is negligible small due to the narrow 
time window, so that we don’t correct the accidental coincidence counts. The violation of the 
CHSH inequality is obtained after 20 km fiber transmission with a modified E91 protocol type 
implementation. 
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Fig. 3. The degree of violation of a CHSH type Bell inequality as a function of 
the PLC operation temperature. 
To examine the stability of the current implementation, fluctuation of the value of S and error 
rates in raw key are measured over 4 hours and are shown in Fig. 4(a).  Although the violation 
of CHSH inequality holds for 200 minutes, it could not last over 4 hours. The origin of the 
instability is the drift of the format transformer by temperature fluctuation. Optical path length 
in the format transformer is influenced by environmental temperature due to the thermal 
expansion. Unfortunately, the thermal control device is not installed in this transformer yet. In 
the next generation system, the thermal control in the format transformer is necessary to 
generate secure keys stably. Nevertheless, the bit error rate is stable during measurement time 
(180 min) with the average bit error rate is 3.71% shown in Fig. 4(b). Raw keys are generated 
using the combination of |H>A|0>B and |V>A|1>B, which are insensitive to the phase of photons. 
The average raw key rate is about 1.5 kbps. The overlap of the time window due to the timing 
jitter of the SPCM is the other main reason of degradation of the value of S. Therefore the 
improvement of the secure key rate with shortening time delay in the AMZI must be followed 
by the shortening of the timing jitter in a SPCM. 
     The average information leakage (IEve) per raw key defined in [32] can be estimated using 
Eq. (4), and plotted in Fig. 4(c). The error bar in this figure is also smaller than the size of the 
symbol. The difference of the mutual information between Alice and Bob I(A, B) and the 
leakage information corresponds to the secure key rate. The mutual information between 
Alice and Bob I(A, B)  estimated by the averaged bit error rate is 0.771 shown with red line in 
Fig. 4(c).  The secure key rate (I(A,B)-IEve)is estimated 70-150 bps with our experimental setup. 
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Fig. 4. Experimental result in a stability measurement with implementing a 
modified E91 protocol. (a) The degree of violation of the CHSH type Bell 
inequality, (b) the error rate in the raw key, and (c) the unconditional bound 
obtained with Eq. (4). Red lines in (a) and (c) indicate the classical limit and the 
mutual information estimated from the average bit error rate, respectively. 
 4. Conclusion 
We confirm the entanglement between the polarization qubit in free space and time-bin qubit 
transmitted through a 20 km fiber with the modified E91 protocol setup. The degree of the 
violation of the CHSH type Bell inequality and the bit error rate of the raw key indicate that 
the secure key can be generated with our setup. The key component of this system is the 
hybrid entanglement photon pair source with the format transformer. It enables us to 
implement various protocols such as bit commitment or oblivious transfer on the optical fiber. 
Those protocols provide features different from the QKD function, and proof of principle 
demonstrations have been carried out with polarization qubit [33,34]. Our hybrid 
entanglement photon source can integrate the advantages of polarization and time-bin qubits 
and implement such protocols with one-to-many service system easily. The hybrid 
entanglement would thus play indispensable roles in secure photonic networks. 
 
